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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Case No. 
JERRY SKOUSEN, I 
vs. 1· 11598 
ALVIN I. SMITH, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE 
OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff in the above entitled case sought to en-
force payment of a promissory note drafted and exe-
cuted by Defendant and payable according to its terms 
to Plaintiff. 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court sitting without a 
jury, The Honorable Stewart M. Hansen, Judge. The 
Court found the promissory note payable and granted 
judgment to Plaintiff for $6,988.85 together with in-
terest, attorney's fees, and costs, all totalling $11,417. 77. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and Respondent, Jerry Skousen, seeks to 
sustain the Judgment in favor of Plaintiff granted by 
the Lower Court. 
STATElVIENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff, Jerry Skousen, is a resident of Mesa, 
Arizona and the Defendant, Alvin I. Smith is a member 
of the Utah Bar and a practicing Utah Attorney. 
On or about February 1, 1962, Alvin I. Smith, 
drafted and executed a promissory note in favor of 
Jerry Skousen (R. 6) which read as follows: 
PROMISSORY NOTE 
$6,988.85 February 1, 1962 
Two years after date, without grace, I promise 
to pay to the order of Jerry Skousen, Six Thou-
sand, Nine Hundred Eighty-Eight, and 85/100 
($6,988.85) Dollars, for value received, with in-
2 
terest from date at the rate of 6% per annum un-
til paid. Principal and interest payable in Lawful 
Money of the United States at Phoenix, Arizona, 
and in case suit is instituted to collect this note or 
any portion thereof, I promise to pay such addi-
tional sum as the Court may adjudge reasonable 
as Attorney's fees in said suit. 
It is understood and agreed that the drawer of 
this note shall not be liable hereunder until and 
unless payment is received from Clifford R. 
"\V alker on notes executed by him in the total sum 
of $13,977.70. 
Isl Alvin I. Smith 
Smith admitted at trial that in April of 1964, 
he received a payment of $2,500.00 from Clifford R. 
\Valker on the sum of $13,000.00 referred to in the sub-
ject note (R. 8-9). 
Although the Walker notes to Smith were due and 
owing early in 1964, when the $2,500.00 payment was 
received, suit was not instituted by Smith against 
'\Talker for payment until September 12, 1967, three 
months after the Complaint in the instant case was 
filed (May 23, 1967), and more than three years after 
the Walker notes became due. 
On May 23, 1967, Plaintiff, Jerry Skousen, filed 
suit in the District Court for payment of the subject note. 
This was more than five years after the date on the note; 
and, Smith had received payment from Walker of 





THE TRIAL CORRECTLY CON-
STRUED THE PROMISSORY NOTE TO 
MAKE DEFENDANT LIABLE FOR PAY-
MENT TO PLAINTIFF WHEN DEFENDANT 
RECEIVED PAYMENT FROM CLIFFORD 
WALKER ON N 0 T E S EXECUTED BY 
WALKER. 
A. 
The subject matter of this litigation is a promissory 
note signed by Alvin Smith, (Defendant) in favor of , 
Jerry Skousen, (Plaintiff), and payable according to its 
terms. Mr. Smith is an experienced attorney and a mem-
ber of the Utah Bar; he drafted the note and executed it. 
Mr. Skousen is a businessman. Both parties had experi-
ence in business transactions. 
The subject note is relatively simple and provides 
in pertinent part that "the drawer of this note [Alvin 
Smith} shall not be liable hereunder until and unless 
payment is received from Clifford R. Walker on notes 
executed by him." (Emphasis added.) It was uncontro-
verted at trial that Clifford Walker had paid to Alvin 
Smith $2,500.00 on notes executed by him, and that 
Alvin Smith had credited the money to those notes. 
Therefore, the only issue before the District Court 
Judge was to construe the note and determine the intent 
of the parties thereto. The proper construction of the 
4 
note was a question of law for the Trial Court. Pacific 
States Cast Iron Pipe Co. v. Harsh Utah Corp., 5 Utah 
;!d 244, 300 P.2d 610. 
The issue before the Trial Court was to determine 
the intent of the parties to the note as to how much Clif-
ford R. 'V alker must pay to Alvin Smith before Smith 
became liable to Skousen on the note. That is, does the 
note require Clifford \Valker to make payment "on" his 
notes, or "of" them. The Court construed the note to re-
quire the following: 
That under the terms of said Promissory Note, 
said Promissory Note was payable within two 
years after date, provided the drawer of the note 
had received payments on Promissory Notes, 
which the Defendant held on Clifford R. Walker. 
(Findings of Fact No. 2, emphasis added.) 
There are three basic methods by which the Trial 
Court could determine the intent of the parties to the 
promissory note: 
I. Hold the parties to their intent as expressed in 
the writing itself unless bona fide ambiguities 
make that impossible. 
2. If there are ambiguities, resolve the issue of in-
tent by reference to other contemporary writings 
of the parties. 
:J. If there are no such writings, admit oral testi-
mony to demonstrate intent. 
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This Court has clearly and definitely taken the first 
position stating that the intent of the parties to a writing 
will be determined from the language within its four 
corners where the writing is reasonably free of ambigu-
ity. Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, Inc., 18 Utah 
2d 186, 415 P.2d 928 (1962); Maw v. Noble, 10 Utah 
2d 440, 354 P.2d 121 (1960); Continental Bank and 
Trust Company v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P.2d 773 
(1957); Ephriam Theater Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 
2d 163, 321 P.2d 221 (1958); and Mathis v. Madsen, 
261 P.2d 952 (1953). 
The rule above is particularly applicable to this case 
in a business transaction between experienced parties 
where the complaining party is an experienced attorney. 
The Trial Court may fairly have inferred that Mr. Smith 
knew by virtue of his legal training and as a matter of 
general knowledge, the difference between the phrases 
"payment of a note" and "payment on a note," and that 
he knew the former refers to a complete payment of a 
note and the latter refers to a partial payment. 
The note could not have been more simply or con-
cisely stated: it suggests no other direction except that 
Alvin Smith would become liable when Clifford R. 
Walker made a payment on notes which he executed. 
This rule represents a conscious policy decision on 
the part of the Court. Parties should be held to their 
clearly expressed intention or the orderly conduct of 
affairs would quickly stop. If parties were allowed to 
amend contracts to cover failure to think, or changes of 
6 
mind, there would be no reliable and dependable con-
tracts. Thus, Justice Henroid in Jens en Used Cars v. 
Rice ( 1958) : 
Elementary it is that in construing contracts 
we seek to determine the intentions of the parties. 
But it is also elementary and of extreme practical 
importance that we hold contracting parties to 
their clear and understandable language deliber-
ately committed to writing and endorsed by them 
as signatories thereto. Were this not so business, 
one with another among our citizens, would be 
relegated to the chaotic, and the basic purpose of 
the law to supply enforceable rules of conduct for 
the maintenance and improvement of an orderly 
society's welfare and progress would find itself 
impotent. It is not unreasonable to hold one re-
sponsible for language which he himself espouses. 
Such language is the only implement he gives us 
to fashion a determination as to the intentions of 
the parties. Under such circumstances we should 
not be required to embosom any request that we 
ignore that very language. This is as it should be. 
The rule excluding matters outside the four 
corners of a clear, understandable document, is a 
fair one, and one's contentions concerning his in-
tent should extend no further than his own clear 
express10ns. 
Jensen Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 276, 323 P.2d 259 
(1958). 
In addition, Utah law allows a finding of uncer-
tainty or ambiguity by the Trial Court "only where there 
is some genuine lac!..· of certainty," it does not refer to 
"strained or merely fanciful or wishful interpretations 
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that may be indulged in." aw v. N able, supra, 354 P.2tl 
at 123. In the latter category surely belong Appellant's 
demonstrations of the charges in the meaning of the 
note which can be accomplished by changing words, sub-
stituting words, or playing with syntax (App. Brief 
13-14, 18. 
In interpreting a contract, the primary rule is to 
determine what the parties intended by what they 
said. The Court may not add, ignore or discard 
words in the process, but attempts to render cer-
tain the meaning of the provision in dispute by an 
objective and reasonable construction of the 
whole contract. 
Cornwall v. Willow Creeh; County Club, 13 Utah 2<l 
160, 369 P.2d 928, 929 ( 1962, emphasis added). 
In considering the controversy here it is well to 
keep in mind the fundamental concepts in regard 
to contracts: that their purpose is to reduce to 
writing the conditions upon which the minds of 
the parties have met and to fix their rights and 
duties in respect thereto. The intent so expressed 
is to be found, if possible within the four corners 
of the instrument itself in accordance with the or-
dinary accepted meaning of the words used. Un-
less there is ambiguity or uncertainty in the lan-
guage so that the meaning is confused, or is sus-
ceptible or more than one meaning, there is no 
justification for interpretation or explanation 
from extraneous sources. It would defeat the ver,Y 
purpose of formal contracts to permit a party to 
invoke the use of words or conduct inconsistent 
with its terms to prove that the parties did not 
mean what they said, or to use such inconsistent 
words to conduct to demonstrate uncertainty or 
















Ephriam, Theater Company v. Hawk, supra at 22. Cf. 
Jensen Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah 2d 276, 323 P.2d 259 
( 1958). 
Thus, by reference to the language of the note 
above, it is clearly provided that payment by Clifford 
'Valker on his notes to Alvin Smith make the latter liable 
to Jerry Skousen for the face amount of the subject 
note. The Trial Court so held. 
B. 
Even had the District Court initially viewed the 
promissory note as ambiguous, it would have properly 
construed the same in favor of Plaintiff and strictly 
against the Defendant as its draftsman and an attorney. 
Even assuming the note to be ambiguous, the Court 
would have still referred to it first in determining the 
intent of the parties thereto. Continental Bank and Trust 
Company v. Bybee, supra; Mathis v. Madsen, supra. In 
so doing it is elementary that a writing be construed 
against its draf tman, and strictly so when the draftsman 
is an attorney as in the case with Mr. Smith. In Con-
tinental Bank and Trust v. Bybee, supra, the Plaintiff, 
an attorney, and draftsman of the subject writing, had 
a dispute with a carpet company regarding a faulty car-
pet installed in his home. The Plaintiff Attorney therein 
drafted a "release" which provided in part that the carpet 
company pay the Attorney $100.00 and release him from 
any indebtedness to the carpet company. The issue was 
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whether the parties intended that Plaintiff be released 
from his promissory note earlier negotiated to a holder 
in due course. There as in the instant case, the Attorney 
draftsman argued that his writing be construed to cover 
a circumstance which he had failed to foresee; or, which 
he forsaw, but failed to provide for when he drafted his 
writing. The Court there said that since Bybee was both 
the Attorney-draftsman of and a party to the instru-
ment, the proper construction of the instrument should 
be strictly against him. Continental Bank and Trust v. 
Bybee, supra, 306 P.2d at 775. 
It therefore follows that the District Court in strict-
ly construing the promissory note against Defendant as 
draftsman and attorney reasonably construed it to im-
pose liability upon him two years after date thereof, 
Clifford Walker having made payments on notes exe-
cuted by him. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN 
NOT EXERCISING ITS EQUITABLE Pow·-
ERS TO VARY THE MEANING OF THE 
PROMISSORY NOTE. 
Even had the Trial Court initially felt that the 
promissory note was a proper subject for the exercise of 
its equitable powers, it is clear from the Findings of Fact 
(No. 4) and the evidence at trial that Defendant was not 
standing before the Court with "clean hands." 
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First, Defendant wrote the language of which he 
complained to the Court. 
Second, Defendant made no effort to alleviate the 
problem he created by his writing, but rather-as the 
Trial Court specifically found (Finding of Fact No. 4 
quoted infra )-sought to take advantage of the condi-
tion: thus, with reference to the language of the note 
("unless payment is received from Clifford R. Walker 
on notes executed by him"), and the fact that Clifford 
Walker had made a $2,500.00 payment, Defendant 
could claim-as he did in this case- that the note really 
should have required full payment, and refuse to pay 
Plaintiff as the note required. If, however, Mr. Skousen 
agreed with the theory above and did not sue on the note, 
Mr. Smith could simply wait more than six years before 
proceeding against Walker and then allege-as Plaintiff 
did here-that the note became due and owing upon the 
first payment by Walker and that the statute of limita-
tions had expired thereby nullifying an action by Skou-
sen on the note. 
The Trial Court in its Findings of Fact No. 4, 
found: 
The Court finds that the Defendant failed and 
neglected or refused to take action against Clif-
ford R. Walker on the Promissory Note which 
the Plaintiff held until after the Plaintiff com-
menced an action against the Defendant; and, be-
cause of the statute of limitations and the possi-
bility of the Plaintiff losing his cause of action on 
the Promissory Note, his action would appear to 
have been appropriately taken. 
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The Trial Court's fact findings reasonably supported by 
evidence should be affirmed on Appeal Sine v. Harper, 
118 Utah 415, 222 P.2d 571, 581 (1950). 
In addition, the oral evidence introduced by De-
fendant was contrary to that necessary under Utah Law 
for its reformation on the basis of mutual mistake of fact: 
1. "Mutual mistake of fact may be defined as error 
in reducing the concurring intentions of the parties to 
writing." Peterson v. Paulson, 24 Wash. 2d 166, 163 
P.2d 830, quoted in Naisbitt v. Hodges, 6 Utah 2d 116, 
307 P.2d 620 (1957). 
2. "Evidence necessary to substantiate the mutual 
mistake of fact must be clear, definite, and convincing 
... " N.aisbitt v. Hodges, supra, at 623. 
3. "The party seeking reformation should not be 
guilty of negligence in the execution of the contract or 
deed or latches in making timely application for its re-
formation." Id. at 623. See generally, Sine v. Harper, 
supra. 
The burden of proving mutual mistake was on De-
fendant, and the burden required was evidence "suffi-
ciently clear and convincing" to satisfy the Court "be-
yond a reasonable doubt" of the existence of a mutual 
mistake of fact. Sine v. Harper, supra, at 581. 
With regard to requirements one and two, there 
was no evidence before the Trial Court to demonstrate 
an intention concurred in by both parties which Mr. 
Smith failed to properly record. Certainly there was no 
12 
evidence sufficient to have convinced the District Court 
beyond a rea.sonable doubt. The most reasonable inf er-
ence from the evidence is that Mr. Smith simply drafted 
without thinking. The Courts have refused to protect 
laymen under these circumstances and the District Court 
therefore correctly refused an Attorney. Cf. Jensen 
Used Cars v. Rice, supra. 
\Vith reference to the third requirement, the Plain-
tiff, in his Complaint, specifically alleged failure, ne-
glect, or ref us al on the part of Defendant to take action 
in collecting the monies owed to him by Clifford Walker. 
The evidence showed three years had lapsed during 
which Defendant did not take action against Clifford 
\'Valker, yet the evidence also showed Mr. Smith was 
aware of Walker's relatives, some of his movements, and 
the fact that he regularly came to Salt Lake every six 
months for L. D. S. conference. Nevertheless, notwith-
standing his earlier failure, Defendant was able to 
promptly sue Walker once he was sued by Mr. Skousen. 
The Trial Court's Findings of Fact reasonably support-
ed by the evidence should be supported on appeal. Sine 
v. Harper, supra. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRAZIER & 'VOOD 
J. Brent Wood 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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